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Across restores domain after phishing takeover exposed users to wallet drains

Across recovered its domain after a registrar attack sent visitors to a phishing site; the bridge says it will repay affected users and publish a post-mortem.

By The Coin Wire Editorial4 min read

Across restores domain after phishing takeover exposed users to wallet drains

Across Protocol said on Nov. 11 that it had recovered its across.to domain and restored normal operations after an attacker redirected visitors to a phishing site. The incident put the bridge’s website, rather than its cross-chain transfer mechanism, at the centre of the reported attack: users who signed malicious token approvals or permits risked giving the attacker access to their wallets. The Block reported that Across blamed social engineering at its domain registrar, Namecheap, and said it would make affected users whole.

Across said the takeover began at about 18:45 UTC on Nov. 10 and that it received an alert within 15 minutes. It moved to take the site offline while security response group SEAL911 flagged the domain as phishing with major wallet providers. Cloudflare later removed the domain’s DNS records, making the fraudulent site inaccessible. Across said Namecheap founder Richard Kirkendall helped it regain control; it has promised a full post-mortem in the coming days.

What did the attacker gain control of?

The attacker gained control of the domain, which directed visitors to a copy of Across’s site. The reported mechanism depended on visitors interacting with that page and signing requests, rather than on an identified exploit of the bridge’s transfer software. That distinction matters: a familiar web address can lead users to a malicious interface even when the underlying service is not the point of entry.

Across said third-party integrations and API users were unaffected, while warning that people who visited the domain before the phishing page was blocked may have been exposed. The recovery therefore restored the front door and services, but does not itself resolve what happened to users who signed requests during the exposure window.

How much was lost, and what is confirmed?

Across has not disclosed its own loss total or the number of affected users. Estimates come from outside investigators and differ in scope: security platform GoPlus put losses at about $350,000 across six networks, as reported by The Block, while blockchain data firm Bitquery said it traced about $348,000 from nine wallets across five chains. Bitquery attributed its count to on-chain transfers it linked to the incident; it said one Aave depositor accounted for $305,000 of the total.

Those figures are estimates, not a loss figure confirmed by Across. The available reporting describes the phishing page as prompting users to sign token approvals or permits, which can authorize transfers from a wallet. The contrast with an attack on bridge contracts is material: in this case, the reported exposure arose through a compromised domain and user signatures. Across’s promise to make affected users whole addresses the losses, but the scope and process for that compensation have not yet been detailed.

What should users and bridge operators watch next?

The next key signal is Across’s post-mortem: it should clarify how the registrar account was compromised, how long the phishing page was reachable, and what steps the team is taking to prevent a repeat. Users will also be looking for details on how to identify affected signatures and claim compensation. Across says systems are operating normally, but restoration alone cannot reverse transactions already made.

For users, the immediate exposure was tied to visiting the compromised site and signing a request; API users and people accessing Across through third-party integrations were not affected, according to the team. For operators, the episode shows the trade-off in relying on a central domain for access: it gives users a straightforward entry point, while making registrar security and rapid domain-level response part of the protocol’s practical security boundary. The response involved the registrar, phishing reports to wallet providers and DNS removal, but the post-mortem will determine what safeguards changed.